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Brain Research and Neuroethics
Abstract
In the past year "neuroethics" has begun to command the attention of neuroscientists, ethicists and
journalists. Ethical questions associated with new knowledge of the human brain have received extensive
coverage in the popular press with cover stories in The Economist and The New Scientist. There has also
been a burst of discussion in the scientific literature (Farah, 2002; Wolpe, 2003), and a number of
professional conferences have recently focused attention on the field. The current capability of
neuroscience to monitor and alter brain function has profound ethical implications, which scientists and
the public have only begun to examine.
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In the past year "neuroethics" has begun to command the attention of neuroscientists,
ethicists and journalists. Ethical questions associated with new knowledge of the human
brain have received extensive coverage in the popular press with cover stories in The
Economist and The New Scientist. There has also been a burst of discussion in the
scientific literature (Caplan, in press, Caplan & Farah, in press; Farah, 2002; Wolpe,
2003), and a number of professional conferences have recently focused attention of the
field. The current capability of neuroscience to monitor and alter brain function has
profound ethical implications, which scientists and the public have only begun to
examine.
New knowledge, new ethical challenges
Recent progress in neuroscience has been fueled by a combination of methodological and
theoretical advances. The most obvious factor responsible for the current explosion of
knowledge is functional neuroimaging. This set of methods, particularly positron
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has
allowed the observation of patterns of activity throughout the brain as humans engage in
different mental processes (Aguirre, 2003).
The introduction of molecular biology techniques into neuroscience has been responsible
for an equally important revolution in understanding the neurochemistry of thought. The
past ten years have seen an acceleration in the ability to identify and control, with ever
more specificity, the molecular mechanisms of human cognition, feeling, and action
(Barondes, 2003).
Finally, there have been important theoretical advances in the behavioral sciences.
Intelligent, motivated behavior results from the interplay of multiple systems for
cognitive and affective information processing, and it is these systems, rather than the
observable behavior, that map most directly onto the brain. With the decline of
behaviorism and the ascendance of cognitive science, models of human information
processing now exist that provide the needed level of psychological analysis for
mediating between behavior and the brain. Recent computational and evolutionary
analyses of human behavior have also informed theorizing about mind-brain relations
(Gazzaniga, Mangun & Ivry, 2003).
Enhancement of normal brain function
An especially controversial ethical issue at the heart of neuroethics is whether and when
it is ethically permissible for normal healthy individuals to use medical and
biotechnological means to enhance their mental functioning. While people have always

tried to enhance their functioning in one way or another through ingestion (alcohol,
caffeine), new drugs are appearing that greatly increase enhancement potential. On
college and high school campuses, the illicit use of Ritalin (methyphenidate) is not
uncommon for purposes of increasing attentional focus when studying (Farah, 2002;
Wolpe, 2003). Medications that are effective in improving the mood of individuals with
depression are sometimes also used as “mood brighteners” by nondepressed people
(Kramer, 1993). New drugs are also appearing that allow persons to go without sleep for
longer periods of time apparently without as many untoward side-effects as current drugs
such as caffeine or methamphetamines.
Several novel drugs for improving memory in dementia are currently in clinical trials,
and at least some of them appear to enhance the memory of normal healthy subjects
(Farah, 2002). As our understanding of the neurochemistry of cognition and emotion
improve further, we can expect newer drugs with ever more specific effects. The
reduction in side effects will in turn entice greater numbers of people to enhance their
brain function pharmacologically.
Methods of neurocognitive enhancement are not restricted to pharmacology, although at
present the nonpharmacologic methods are too rudimentary for enhancement of function
in healthy humans. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), used experimentally in the
treatment of psychiatric disorders, might one day be used to activate or inhibit specific
cognitive systems for purposes of enhancement. Brain-machine interfaces being
developed to augment memory and control robot arms might, in the even more distant
future, enhance the cognition of normal individuals (Hoag, 2003).
Is enhancement right or wrong? The answer will almost surely depend on the specific
type of enhancement and population, but certain principles seem to apply to the question
in the abstract (Farah, 2002; Caplan, in press, Wolpe, 2003). If the benefit to be gained is
the improvement of normal function rather than the remediation of disease lower levels
of risk seem appropriate especially where children are involved. If enhancement is not to
be abused then the prevention of coercion by employers and schools seeking higher
performing workers and students is essential. Choice must always be obtained before
enhancement can be undertaken in competent adults.
In addition, there will be broader social effects of brain-based cognitive enhancement.
One such effect is the socioeconomic advantage likely to accrue to groups that practice
enhancement. Policies that promote equal access may prevent the exacerbation of already
existing inequities in our society. Loss of diversity, stigmatizing the normal or the
disabled and the commodification of human talent are other potential social effects that
must be considered. Finally, we must consider the ways in which the fundamental sense
of self and agency may be altered when and if neurocognitive self-improvement becomes
commonplace (Wolpe, 2003).
Neuroimaging of psychological states and traits
In recent years it has been possible to correlate a surprising number of different
personality attributes, attitudes, and predilections with patterns of brain activity,

measured at rest or while performing a task (Canli & Amin, 2003). For example,
neuroticism and extraversion are associated with distinctive patterns of brain response to
emotionally pleasant or unpleasant pictures. Attitudes toward individuals of other races
are associated with patterns of brain response to photographs of same and other-race
faces.
Studies, while still rudimentary, have revealed suggestive yet troubling uses for
neuroimaging. The likelihood that a violent criminal will act violently in the future can be
estimated based on resting brain scans. Intentional deception results in a different pattern
of brain activity from truthfulness. These and other examples of potentially sensitive
information available from brain scans are discussed by Canli and Amin (2003) and
Farah (2002). It should be emphasized that the correlations between psychological
variables and brain activity are generally not high enough to make brain scanning a useful
tool for screening or assessment. However, it is also the case that some individual scans
may be sufficiently distinctive that they do offer reliable information. But those seeking
to detect criminal intent or to detain those who may pose a threat to the security of others
may be willing to utilize information that is imperfect in lieu of anything else.
Functional brain imaging has the potential to breach the privacy of a person’s own
thoughts. Privacy is therefore high on the list of ethical issues raised by the new brain
scanning technologies. Ironically, the more pressing social issue raised by scanning
concerns its inability to measure mental or neural processing meaningfully. The aura of
high tech and the impact of visual images may lead judges and juries to put more weight
on evidence from functional neuroimaging than is warranted. A better public
understanding of the capabilities of imaging is necessary to prevent an over-reliance on
this source of information.
The neurological revolution has not drawn quite the same attention as the revolution in
genetics in terms of reflection on the ethical and social challenges raised by scientific
progress. It should. The chances are that changes in our brains to diagnose or enhance our
behavior will take place in our brains just as quickly as they do in our genes.
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